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Technology Transfer in the Ontario 
Harvester Industry 1830-1900 
G O R D O N M. WINDER 
RÉSUMÉ 
Cette étude examine, dans un 
contexte continental, l'innovation 
ontarienne en moissonneuses. On 
maintient que les licences reçues 
par les sociétés ontariennnes des 
propriétaires américains, loin d'en-
foncer les fabricants ontariens dans 
la dépendance technologique, ont 
transféré la technologie aux socié-
tés canadiennes. Entre 1830 et 1900 
les fabricants ontariens ont profité 
des licences américaines pour ac-
quérir les dessins des produits; dès 
1890 ils avaient maîtrisé la posses-
sion des dessins et avaient construit 
la capacité technique de produire 
leurs propres dessins brevetés. 
ABSTRACT 
Ontario innovation in harvesting 
machinery is reviewed in continental 
context. It is argued that rather than 
embedding Ontario manufacturers 
in technological dependence, license 
agreements taken out by Ontario 
firms with U.S. licensors transferred 
technology to Canadian companies. 
In the period 1830 to 1900 Ontario 
manufacturers took advantage of 
U.S. licenses to acquire product 
designs and by 1880 had mastered 
ownership of the designs and built 
the technical ability to produce their 
own patented designs. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Our agricultural machinery is made after Ohio and Illinois patterns, with 
perhaps a few Canadian improvements. 
Canadian Manufacturer, 6 January, 1882, p. 2. 
Canadian manufacturers demonstrated little concern for the disad-
vantages of technological dependence through licensing agreements. 
[They lost] ... the capacity to manipulate technology through the crea-
tion of ... [their] own marketable innovations. 
G.Williams, 1983, Not For Export, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, pp. 24-25. 
Canada's technological dependence was both deep-rooted and conscious-
ly cultivated. Technology, like capital and labour, was something to be al-
located from a more developed area, and Canadian government policy 
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from an early period assiduously solicited an influx of American techni-
ques. 
RT.Naylor, 1975, History of Canadian Business, Toronto, James Lorimer, II, p. 63. 
Canadian industry and the agricultural implements industry in particular have a very bad press when it comes to product innovation. The industry has been accused of long-standing 
technological dependence, which in turn is used as an explanation 
of the domination of Canadian industry in the twentieth century by 
American direct investment. It is argued here that the nineteenth 
century Canadian harvester industry cannot be characterized by the 
terminology of technological dependence invoked to describe twen-
tieth century experience. Rather, two alternative conclusions are 
proposed and defended: 
1. Until the last decade of the nineteenth century there was an 
open market in harvester technology which operated 
throughout the United States and Ontario without favour. 
2. Within this market Ontario harvester companies operated as 
both innovators and adopters and mastered the development 
of harvesting machines as well as the ownership of patent 
rights. 
While there was an imbalance in the flow of licences between 
Canada and the U.S.A. in favour of a south to north direction, and 
while Canadian firms built largely American machines, these are 
insufficient grounds for declaring there to be technological de-
pendence. Although Williams and Naylor claim that the patent 
data support the conclusion of dependence their case is flawed 
because they ignore several aspects of the nature of the nineteenth 
century market for product innovations and the ways in which 
transactions in this market can be measured. 
Flows of technology cannot be measured through American 
patent registrations in Canada. As Rosenberg has pointed out, 
patents are a poor guide to innovation and comparisons between 
the patent records of different industries are best viewed 
as explaining the allocation of inventive effort, since the set of patented 
inventions bears a tenuous relation, as Schmookler recognized, to the 
much smaller set of commercially successful innovations. Not only do 
most patents never reach the stage of commercial exploitation, but 
many commercially successful inventions are unpatented.1 
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Within this industry the patent record in Canada is best discussed 
as a record of competing claims for property rights in the context 
of significant changes in product type and institutional changes in 
technology transfer. To regard patents as referring to particular 
inventions is ludicrous in this industry, as will become apparent. 
Patent registrations far exceed innovations and licences.2 The num-
ber of patents indicates a market for innovations rather than the 
drowning of Canadian inventiveness under a deluge of Yankee 
patents. At best patents have an ambiguous character as both a sign 
of an invention and as a property right and any discussion of them 
is necessarily complicated by the gradual shift from farmers to 
mechanics as the important innovators. Nevertheless, by analyzing 
both company technology histories and the relative proportions of 
Canadian patents, American patents, American patents registered 
in Canada and American assignments of patent rights to 
Canadians, a great deal can be revealed about the patterns of 
technology transfer in this industry, that is about ownership of 
technology. 
Further, the technology market in this industry was not simply a 
Canadian one. Many American companies participated in the same 
way as Canadian firms in a North American, indeed an internation-
al, technology market. Even the largest American harvester com-
panies took out licences from other companies. Furthermore 
Canadians registered patents in the United States, won medals at 
international exhibitions and, in one case, may even have licensed 
a leading American company. There was no peculiarly Canadian 
policy of soliciting American technique. 
Consequently it is insufficient to measure the one-way flow of 
American patents using Canadian patent data. Ontario harvester 
companies were linked into a common North American pool of 
technology. The most important form of access to this technology 
was through licenses, but there were other ways. Technical advice 
was obtained from experts and workers who had served appren-
ticeships or worked in other plants. Attendance at agricultural trials 
and fairs where ideas were exchanged was common practice. There 
was also domestic product innovation, including adaptation of 
American designs to local conditions and the transfer of Canadian 
improvements to American firms. Domestic industrial and techni-
cal capability was established through technology transfer to local-
ly owned companies through licences. In the mid-1870s domestic 
firms began to patent their own product developments though 
there were few major Canadian inventions because of the late start 
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of the Canadian industry. Ontario firms followed American har-
vester development faithfully, because of the similarities of the 
farm systems and the early start of the U.S. producers, but, most of 
all, because of the openness of the international technology market 
in their product. 
A licence to manufacture represents a short term rental of tech-
nology with the possibility of technology transfer, including 
ownership, to the domestic firm. As long as a rental market for 
harvester technology under licences persisted the proper questions 
for us to ask concerning "dependence" are: did Canadian firms 
learn to develop or adapt the technology, come to own it, and 
establish their own means for producing it? In the nineteenth 
century licensing was the standard way of obtaining an economic 
return from product technology in distant regional markets and 
was thus directly related to the iron, steam and wood technology of 
the small-scale, craft industry of the era. It is anachronistic to 
apply the term "technological dependence" to this period since the 
term is properly associated with "truncation" and the branch plant 
economy which are twentieth century phenomena. In the long 
term technological dependence did not rise out of licensing but out 
of the emergence of corporations with their own engineering 
departments producing designs related to the new technology of 
steel, gasoline engines and chemicals which could not be mastered 
by mechanics or farmers, and with an internal market for technol-
ogy which they then transferred through branch plants and inter-
national sales organizations. Corporations arose in this industry 
partly because of the interminable problems involved in trying to 
secure control of innovation through market power, but also be-
cause of changes in production. 
Given the nature of the nineteenth century market for harvest-
ing machinery technology Ontario firms had the opportunity in 
the period from 1850 to 1890 to move into harvester manufacture 
on the basis of American product systems. The key questions are: 
how did the Ontario harvester industry fit into the international 
pattern of product transfer? what were the effects on its long term 
competitiveness of its early reliance on American product systems? 
did the industry develop its own inventive capability? 
In answering these questions the paper is organized in four 
sections. The first briefly summarizes the development of reapers, 
mowers and harvesters and the origins and nature of innovation. 
The paper then turns to a description of the implications of chang-
ing industrial organization for technology transfer in the industry. 
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The remaining sections describe innovation in the Ontario in-
dustry. The Patent Act of 1872 is used as a break point and the 
discussion of post-1872 harvester innovation describes one 
company's product and patent history in detail, before placing this 
case in context. 
2. DEVELOPMENT OF HARVESTING MACHINERY 
American innovation in harvesting machinery has been discussed 
in some detail by L.Rogin and R.L.Ardrey within the context of the 
machinery's labour displacing capability.3 Patenting occurred in 
three quite distinct waves (Figure 1) which appear to be distinct 
product cycles for self-raking reapers, hinged bar mowers and com-
bined reaper-mowers in the 1850s, for harvesters in the 1870s and 
for binders in the 1880s. But so far there has been no analysis of the 
patents on this basis, and we must rely on the summaries of 
product development given by Ardrey and Rogin. 
The basic development in this industry was the reaper. The two 
important early American designs were those of Hussey and Mc-
Cormick. Both machines were relatively simple, consisting of 
many wooden parts and a metal cutting apparatus, the knives of 
which were driven by the main drive wheel. Initially, attention was 
paid to the arrangement of sickles and knives in the cutter bar and 
here Hussey secured important patents which were licensed to 
virtually every North American reaper and mower manufacturer. 
Apart from refinements to the working parts, additions were made 
to these reapers in the next two decades first manually and then 
automatically to rake the grain into piles. The new reapers were 
respectively known as hand-rake reapers and side-rake or dropper 
reapers. 
Mowers of hay were developed later than reapers. Reapers and 
mowers perform similar functions, follow similar design principles 
and the patents relating to them are interrelated and overlapping. 
While companies tended to make both reapers and mowers, the 
designs seldom had parts which were interchangeable between 
machines. Combined reapers and mowers did not appear until the 
late 1850s. By 1853, one wheel, rigid bar mowers were being made, 
but mower development did not reach its peak until the two wheel 
hinged bar mowers appeared in the late 1850s.4 Combined reaper-
mowers were either mowers which had attachments (self rakes, 
table and reel) for reaping, or were reapers with the rakes, table and 
reel detachable. 
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Figure 1 
Canadian and U.S. Patents for Harvesting Machinery 1850-1890. 
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The harvester was in principle a reaper with an elevating device 
- an endless canvas apron driven by chains and rollers - which 
raised the cut grain from the reaper table. Initially the grain was 
then bound by men standing on the harvester. Later it was done by 
mechanical binding devices. Wire binders were introduced in 
1877-78, but were quickly replaced by twine binders from 1880 on. 
The twine binder and harvester combination, sometimes referred 
to as a harvester-binder or simply as a harvester, represents the 
culmination of reaper development and after 1880 only minor 
changes were made to the function of machines. Innovation con-
tinued, however, in the construction of machines with the intro-
duction of steel fabrication (1882-87) and roller bearings in the late 
1880s. 
The header represents a different principle. It was pushed into 
the grain and the cutting apparatus took the head off the grain 
rather than cutting the stalk with the head. This reduced the 
amount of straw that had to be threshed. However the header 
could only be used when the grain was very dry and therefore 
tended to be used only in California, Australia and Argentina. It 
was also found in some western American states where the labour 
efficiency of the machine offset the loss in grain occasioned by the 
need to delay the start of harvest until the grain was sufficiently 
dry. The header and combine are related and constitute a separate 
line of development. The combine consisted of the combination of 
a header and a threshing machine with a self feeder, elevator and 
spreader which was initially driven alongside but in the 1920s 
incorporated into one machine. The combination was effected in 
California in the 1880s but was not practised elsewhere. In the late 
1920s the integration of threshing and harvesting was ac-
complished by the introduction of steel, self-propelled combines 
which were developed in Canada, Australia and the United States. 
But these did not become important until the early 1940s and until 
then threshing machinery and harvesting machinery were separate 
lines of product development. 
In product cycle terms reapers and mowers had already reached 
product standardization by 1870 and harvesters and binders by 
1885. In its early stages, each basic machine was the subject of 
constant innovation of an incremental kind. Each year a slightly 
different model would be produced.5 By the 1880s style changes 
and annual changes had become minor and the important 
developments, also of an evolutionary character, were in harvesters 
and binders. Product development was incremental in character 
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because all of the harvest functions were gradually combined in 
harvesting machines: reaping, raking, binding, threshing. Al-
though self-rake reapers replaced earlier reapers and binders 
replaced self-rake machines, the successive product developments 
were each based on previous machines. There was a great deal of 
continuity in harvester design despite constant experimentation, 
annual modifications and styling changes. It is impossible to iden-
tify a single inventor for virtually any product modification or even 
early developments. Instead, we must look to a long process of 
innovation, involving prior inventions and alternative designs.6 
Innovation was an "evolutionary process'' of "innumerable small 
improvements and modifications", which merely rearranged or 
recombined existing components or introduced new materials.7 An 
individual product became functionally more complex over time, 
but even at the beginning of the industry there was no one inven-
tor, only complex pedigrees, systems of related patents giving con-
trol over a marketable product, and general, industry-wide product 
developments. These characteristics of product development had 
important implications for both the pattern of technology transfer, 
which became characterized by copying, licensing and collective 
invention, and for industrial organization, which was dominated 
by skilled workers and foundry operations because innovation 
tended to become centred in the factory rather than on the farm. 
3. INNOVATION AND CHANGING INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION: THE WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY 
Any discussion of technology transfer in this industry is compli-
cated by the fact that harvester manufacture grew out of farming 
and foundry operations. Reapers and mowers were transferred to 
foundries and it was the skilled workmen and, in a few cases, the 
inventor-manufacturers in these establishments, sometimes aided 
by independent farmer inventors, who were responsible for sub-
sequent product development. In agricultural implements as a 
whole inventions tended to be made by farmers,8 but not so in 
reapers and mowers. Inventions, including the ideas behind both 
the wire and twine binding mechanisms, were made by small 
manufacturers, farmers and other people not engaged in manufac-
ture but increasingly reaper and mower patents were registered in 
the names of factory personnel. 
The refinement of an invention was the area in which the 
industry's skilled mechanics dominated. Initially it was the task of 
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the foundry owner to develop or acquire the product. Later factory 
superintendents in association with key skilled workers were 
responsible for innovation. Until around 1890 product develop-
ment was achieved by a complex interaction between skilled 
mechanics, owners (controlling patents), and "inventors" brought 
into the plant, supplemented by the purchase of patent rights and 
patterns from other inventors and manufacturers. There were no 
engineers with university engineering degrees in the industry until 
about 1890. Scientific testing procedures were rare but separate 
"engineering departments" were established in the large works in 
the 1880s. These consisted of groups of skilled mechanics. Well 
before this time the foundry had become the centre of innovation 
in the harvester industry. 
Foundries faced two fundamental logistical problems. They were 
unable to specialize and attain scale economies of production be-
cause founding followed batch production and proved difficult to 
mechanize. A second problem related to the "friction of distance": 
a large organization of salesmen or the services of a wholesale 
merchant were required if sales were to be more than local transac-
tions. One way founders dealt with these problems was by turning 
to an extended product range using the same general-purpose 
capital equipment. This allowed them to make the most of local 
demand while capitalizing on the versatility of their foundry. Ex-
pansion of production to new areas was then achieved by estab-
lishing new local foundries.9 Under this strategy there was local 
innovation on the basis of many fairly similar machines 
throughout the industry, little direct competition, and transfer of 
personnel and ideas rather than products between regions. Alterna-
tively, the foundry could specialize in harvesting machinery, ex-
pand production even although few economies of scale or 
specialization would accrue, and develop an extensive network of 
set-up men, salesmen, repair men and merchant houses to sell 
machines over a wide territory. The potential for growth using this 
strategy was limited by the capacity of the plant, and the extent of 
competition. Foundries following this strategy sought to overcome 
the "friction of distance" but were unable to escape constraints on 
production efficiency. They also remained enmeshed in the existing 
system of foundry-to-foundry transactions in ideas, patterns, product 
designs and workers. 
It was through the movement of skilled labour, private capital 
and patterns to daughter foundries that technology was transferred 
to new regions. The resulting movement of artisans across the 
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Figure 2 
Technology Transfer on the Industrial Frontier 1830-1860. 
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Note: This pattern of technology transfer occurred throughout the 
North American industry regardless of the border between 
Canada and the United States. New foundries were 
established on an industrial frontier by the migration 
patterns of skilled worker and founders. 
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North American continent as part of the moving frontier of settle-
ment constituted an industrial frontier (Figure 2).10 Southern On-
tario was part of the North American foundry frontier from 1830 
through to the mid 1850s.11 Like regions south of the border, Ontario 
developed a pool of skilled workers, capital equipment, and long 
lasting network linkages with American suppliers of apprentices, 
materials, products and techniques. Port towns became centres for the 
resettlement of founders through southern Ontario.12 As a result On-
tario foundries were replete with U.S. connections, and these connec-
tions were important in the informal transfer of products and 
techniques. In both the U.S. and Canada the manufacture of reapers 
and mowers was diffused to foundry operations through these con-
nections between foundries in the 1850s.13 These relations were 
codified in licensing agreements. 
To begin with McCormick and Hussey dominated diffusion of 
the product technology since they controlled the key patents, and 
pioneered manufacture of reapers.14 After their patents expired in 
1847, the number of patents taken out on reapers and mowers 
increased rapidly and new sources of product development 
emerged from their licensed manufacturers. At least thirteen dis-
tinct reaper, mower and harvester product systems, established 
before the American Civil War, have been identified by Ardrey and 
Rogin.15 These product systems consisted of products, each as-
sociated with a brand name, which took a particular form or 
design, and were systematically related to a set of patents and 
license agreements. Collections of related patents protected a 
product as a system of interrelated parts, which could be licensed 
to other manufacturers. A licence or shop right usually entailed the 
transfer of patterns and occasionally machinery to allow produc-
tion of the patented forms and arrangements. Each system was 
related to a geography of regional producers with assigned shop 
rights and sales territories. Each product system served as the basis 
for ongoing improvements and modifications, and there was con-
siderable leeway available to the licensed manufacturer to alter the 
machine and its parts. In this way the transfer of complex 
machines between foundries was made possible under formal 
license agreements. 
Several of the new manufacturers in the 1850s began by building 
under licence, and all of them allocated licences to other manufac-
turers. As the number of competing patent systems increased in the 
1850s and 1860s so did the number of reaper and mower manufac-
turers. Licenses were granted to Canadian, British and European 
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manufacturers. The size of territorial assignments increased. The 
product systems were refined in the 1860s so that by 1870 "the 
foundation features of reapers had all been invented and substan-
tially perfected."16 In the 1870s new manufacturers were licensed 
and few if any new systems were developed. One or two new 
entrants grew very quickly to become large producers but the 
prospects for creating new product systems were severely limited.17 
Late starters did contribute innovations, but the main develop-
ments in the 1870s and 1880s were in binding apparatus and here 
the trend was for industry-wide adoption of a basic design with 
minor modifications by company.18 Despite the rather successful 
attempts by the industry majors to buy binder rights and control 
other manufacturers through infringement suits, binder designs 
were widely diffused across the industry. Licences remained a com-
mon feature of the industry well into the 1880s, and every 
manufacturer particpated in the licensing market, usually as a 
licensee. 
Transfer by licence really amounted to a formalization of exist-
ing transfers between foundries to cope with property rights and 
more complex products, only now the product system was moved 
instead of skilled workers and patterns. A royalty payment was 
expected by the owners of the product system. There was little risk 
involved for the licensor. His firm was unlikely to be able to supply 
the market on its own, and would have found it expensive and 
time-consuming to develop its own sales organization.19 He would 
enjoy a low-risk return on his existing investment. The licensee 
obtained a working machine and a chance to learn the new 
product. He had to accept a restriction on his sales area, but this 
would only last the life of the patent. The large companies par-
ticipated fully in the "patent wars" taking out and giving licences, 
hunting down alternative patent rights, launching infringement 
suits and bargaining with other majors over product rights. Small 
manufacturers were in a less secure position: 
The "little man" ... was ... obliged to pay royalty to his big competitor 
and enter the selling field under a severe handicap. Because types of im-
plements were changing so rapidly, he was periodically faced with the al-
ternative of making expensive alterations in factory machinery or going 
out of business. Unless he were exceptionally fortunate, his future and 
his present were one - to earn a modest living by supplying the locality 
in the immediate neighborhood of his plant.20 
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At least, this was increasingly the situation facing small plants in 
the 1880s as their window of opportunity for independent product 
development, or escape from licences began to close in the late 
1870s, but it was not the case in the United States before 1875, and 
in Canada, as we shall see, national patent laws delayed attempts at 
monopoly by the leading American firms. 
Until the window closed, a complex pattern of technology trans-
fer existed in this industry. In addition to the interfirm licensing 
agreements, manufacturers obtained inventions and innovations 
from local farmers, from skilled workers in their own factories and 
from consulting or joint ventures with other companies. Process 
innovations tended to be transferred from capital equipment sup-
pliers. Parts, especially steel components (cutter bars, reaper knives, 
and sickles) were purchased from specialist parts suppliers. Here 
Whitman and Barnes Manufacturing Company of Akron, Ohio 
obtained a near monopoly in the 1870s. It was also possible to 
make patterns from a finished machine and then manufacture the 
machine in a foundry, but there were few cases of illegal copying.21 
Manufacturers were seldom so blatant as to copy an entire machine 
but most companies sent representatives to observe competitor's 
machines at field trials, fairs and expositions. The latest innova-
tions would be noted and alternative means found to achieve the 
same result. This meant that the product systems could be trans-
ferred between foundries in a variety of ways. 
Beyond this interfirm interchange the state encouraged innova-
tion through departments of agriculture. These departments spon-
sored the fairs and exhibitions at which bonuses and prizes were 
awarded to implement manufacturers. In both the U.S. and Canada 
boards of agriculture and the arts, mechanics' institutes, and en-
gineering schools were funded by the department. These institu-
tions supplied technical education to skilled workers, and 
disseminated information and intelligence garnered by the depart-
ment on products, patents and technical matters. The ministers of 
agriculture were also responsible for the patent office and the 
census. This infrastructure was designed to facilitate domestic in-
novation by training local skilled workers and to assist the informal 
transfer of products and techniques between firms. 
Transfers by license and the informal foundry to foundry trans-
fers were part of the general expansion programmes of American 
manufacturers. They licensed other American manufacturers as 
well as British and Canadian firms. By 1860 all the leading 
American companies had licensees in Britain and, except for Mc-
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Cormick, in Canada.22 Within the United States the patent laws 
required registration of licences, transfers and assignments of 
patent rights, and these rights were fought over in and out of the 
patent courts. The U.S. patent law had the effect of encouraging 
licences, since a licence could be used in court to ensure ownership 
of the invention. Outside the United States, American manufac-
turers were confronted with various legal regimes regarding licen-
ces and patent registrations. Until 1872, Canada did not require 
registration of licensing agreements and forbade registration of 
foreign patents. Changes to the Canadian patent law in 1872 
recognized U.S. patent rights and licences. Consequently, the early 
licensing agreements between U.S. and Canadian manufacturers 
took place without regard to the international border, tariffs, or 
Canadian patent law. To all intents and purposes Canada was part 
of the U.S. market in reaper and mower patent rights. 
The overall effect was to ensure a common market in new in-
novations. The industry was characterized by "learning by doing" 
and "collective invention". The American reaper and mower 
patents quickly became a tangled mess of overlapping claims in 
which no company could monopolize the store of patent rights. 
Innovations were diffused across the United States and internation-
ally by a combination of licensing, patent purchasing and copying. 
It was almost impossible to prevent the diffusion of new innova-
tions to competitors. It was only possible to make them pay a 
royalty and court costs. Patent protection was very difficult to 
establish because of the multiplicity of ways to do the same thing 
and the increasing number of overlapping and unrelated patents. 
This did not prevent leading manufacturers from trying to estab-
lish patent monopolies by waging a ceaseless campaign to purchase 
patent rights and form patent pools with other manufacturers and 
patent holders.23 By the 1870s it was standard practice for com-
panies to purchase licenses from other manufacturers, and to 
recruit personnel from other shops. It was not until the develop-
ment of binders that these practices were able to be used to make 
the industry accept one product design controlled by one ring. 
Even although the ring obtained control after the binder had been 
diffused to a number of firms, this made the transition to binder 
manufacture particularly difficult for small manufacturers, since 
there was no longer a series of competing product systems from 
which to buy. 
Attempts at patent control shifted the locus of patent activity 
away from the inventor to the owner of many patents, so that the 
Scientia canadensis 51 
American patent system, "rather than promoting invention 
through protection of the inventor, ... had come to protect and 
reward the monopolizer of inventions/'24 But until the rise of the 
science-based corporation, monopoly had to be achieved through 
lawsuits and patent purchasing, not the ownership of laboratories. 
The overall effect of the patent litigation was to maintain the 
predominant positions of the early entrants to the industry: 
The ten or a dozen producers who controlled the rather small annual 
supply of reapers and mowers in I860, were equally masters of an out-
put ten times as large twenty-five years later.25 
But in this industry no one firm was able to create a patent 
monopoly.26 Patent claims became so complicated and intercon-
nected that it was often deemed easier to share the rights than seek 
a monopoly.27 For a long time, a common market of competing 
product systems characterized intellectual property rights and 
small manufacturers were able to enter the industry at only a slight 
disadvantage. 
Attempts at patent control and ownership within the technol-
ogy market required firms specializing in harvesters to develop 
engineering departments. Some firms accomplished this by merg-
ing separate organizations.28 In the 1880s Deering, McCormick, 
W.A.Wood and Piano became single company corporations based 
on single plants producing fifty to one hundred thousand 
machines each. Product innovation became centred in engineering 
departments although these were staffed by skilled mechanics and 
not engineers. Their chief function was to convert industry-wide 
inventions into innovations controlled within the company's 
product system. As production techniques became more scientific 
and as the products were standardized using increasing numbers of 
steel parts, university-trained engineers were brought into these 
departments which became the centres of invention as well as 
innovation. This shift to corporate organization during the 1890s 
changed the basis of technology transfer and competition in the 
industry. Interfirm technology transfers were phased out as the 
corporations began to develop their own product innovations and 
to produce and sell them for the entire North American market 
within their own organization. Nevertheless, there were several 
competing corporations and therefore licensing continued until 
around 1890. The open market for harvesting machinery technol-
ogy was effectively closed with the I.H.C. merger of 1902 following 
52 Technology in the Ontario Harvester Industry 
the financial failure of many of the larger American harvester 
companies. Corporate control closed the market in licences by the 
twentieth century. 
In the United States then, there was an intial period from 1830 
to 1847 when two companies virtually controlled reaper patent 
rights in a very small market. By the 1850s U.S. patent law had 
converted reaper and mower innovations into commodities with 
an extensive market. New product systems in reapers, mowers, 
combined machines and harvesters were developed and licensed to 
many firms. By the 1880s firms were beginning to control the still 
growing market for innovations through more effective patent 
pools associated with the new binder designs. For about 30 years it 
was possible to enter the reaper and mower business on the basis of 
a licence and develop a firm with competitive product design. 
Companies which entered the industry in this fashion were placed 
at a disadvantage in the market but could also gain from technol-
ogy transfer and rapid expansion. This constituted a window of 
opportunity for late starters. 
The slow growth of the Canadian market meant that Canadian 
companies operated within this common market in product sys-
tems on the same terms as the late starter U.S. companies. Their 
position inside the market was protected by the Canadian patent 
law of 1872, which made it impossible for the major American 
companies to protect their patent rights in Canada without licens-
ing a domestic manufacturer. Canadian companies were therefore 
partly protected from American competition in their market. Their 
position in the product market therefore became substantially bet-
ter than that of small American companies because they were 
immune from the law suits of the patent pools. 
Product innovation and diffusion was therefore intimately 
bound up with the nature of innovation, the pattern of industrial 
organization, the channels for technology transfer and the rules 
governing intellectual property rights. In this industry innovation 
was evolutionary and collective, and industrial organization was 
for a long time restricted to at best regional production units. 
Technology was diffused as part of an industrial frontier, by licen-
ses and copying. Consequently from 1850 to 1890, Ontario was a 
beneficiary and contributor like other producing regions. 
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4. ONTARIO HARVESTER DEVELOPMENT TO 1872 
The Ontario industry followed harvester development in the 
United States, developing some ten years later than the American 
market. This late start was not a serious disadvantage because 
Ontario companies had access to the North American product 
innovations. By adopting American product developments 
through licences and copying they could quickly master reaper and 
mower technology, and they could then develop their own product 
systems, keep up with every development through judicious licens-
ing agreements, or emulate many of their American counterparts 
by stopping product development when they failed to obtain a 
necessary licence. At least two firms, Massey and Harris, late 
starters by American standards, became international competitors 
in all harvesting machinery lines by the 1880s, through exploiting 
the American market in product innovations. Ontario manufac-
turers did very well out of the licensing game, better than most 
American late starters. This would suggest that rather than creating 
technological dependence, licensing promoted technology trans-
fer. 
Ontario generated only a small market for harvesters until the 
1870s. Until then Ontario reaper makers were founders producing 
for local markets within the province, not manufacturers produc-
ing for the regional Ontario market. The small size of Ontario 
foundries (only one firm had more than 150 workers in 1871 and 
most employed under 30) posed a problem because complex 
products like reapers and mowers could not be constructed in 
blacksmith shops.29 Indeed few of the leading manufacturers in the 
U.S. manufactured all the parts of their reapers themselves.30 Fully 
equipped foundry, carpentry and machine shops were required, 
and a large inventory of patterns. There were only two ways to 
transfer this technology. One was a comprehensive technical agree-
ment between an established manufacturer and another foundry 
using licences to continue the old transfer system under a proper 
legal agreement. They covered the provision of patterns for 
moulds, some machinery and technical assistance. The second 
method was for an established shop to copy someone else's 
machine. This presumed a previous transfer of process techniques 
to the firm of the copier and a long period of experimentation. It 
also prevented future linkages with the firm whose machines were 
copied. 
Company catalogues confirm that generally Ontario improve-
ments, whether patented or not, were made on American designs. 
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Table 1 
Ontario Manufacturers Known to Have Built 
American Reapers and Mowers Before 1872. 
Manufacturer Product System Year 
1. J. Bingham Buckeye mower, Dodge rake 1871 
2. Brown & Patterson, 
Whitby Cayuga Chief mower 1871 
3. L. Cossitt Buckeye reaper 1863 
4. Eastwood & Co., 
Ingersoll Buckeye reaper 1871 
5. J. Forsyth, Dundas Ohio combined, 
Johnston's self rake, Buckeye mower 1871 
6. Frost & Wood, 
Smith's Falls Wood mower 1861 
7. J. Grout Buckeye reaper, Dodge rake 1871 
8. J. Haggert, St. Mary's Ohio combined, Johnston's self rake 1868 
9. J. Hall, Oshawa Ohio combined, Cayuga Chief mower, 
Hubbard reaper, Brinkerhoff reaper 1864 
10. Harris & Son, 
Beamsville Kirby mower, Dodge rake 1871 
11. Massey, Newcastle Ketchum mower, Burrell reaper 1851 
Manny reaper 1855 
Wood mower and self rake 1862 
Hubbard reaper 1871 
12. Maxwell & Whitelaw, 
Paris Sprague mower 1871 
13. Noxon, Ingersoll Ohio combined 1864 
Johnston self rake 1871 
14. Oswald & Patterson Buckeye mower, Dodge rake 1871 
15. Patterson & Bro, Seymour & Morgan, 
Richmond Hill Cayuga Chief mower 1868 
16. Paxton, Tate & Co., 
Port Perry 
Marsh harvester 1868 
17. L.D. Sawyer, Hamilton Ohio combined 1861 
Wood mower 1869 
Dodge rake 1871 
18. J. Scott, Dundas Wood mower and reaper n.d. 
19. Stratford Agricultural 
Works Ohio combined n.d. 
20. J. Watson, Ayr Wood mower 1863 
Johnson self rake 1871 
Note: The year given indicates either when machines were first 
produced or the date of reference. 
Source: Canadian Farmer's Manual of Agriculture, 1876, 490-492; 
L.D. Sawyer & Co., Illustrated Catalogue, 1869; R.T. Naylor, 
History of Canadian Business 1867-1914, II 41-42; 
W.G. Phillips, The Agricultural Implements Industry in Canada, 39. 
Scientia canadensis 55 
The first known case of a licence granted for harvesting machinery 
was Massey's licence for the Ketchum mower and Burrell reaper 
obtained on a trip through New York state in 1851.31 Other com-
panies followed, although it was not until the 1860s that 
widespread production of American designs occurred (Table 1). 
Each American product system was made by several Ontario 
manufacturers, but in the 1860s every Canadian manufacturer 
built American machines. 
Until 1870 Ontario manufacturers produced a remarkably small 
range of American designs: mowers and combined machines, a few 
reapers, all from New York state and Ohio. Some Canadian 
manufacturers imported parts and fitted them to local iron and 
wood components while others used American patterns and 
moulded their own parts.32 Perhaps some companies "pirated" 
American designs by making patterns from American machines, 
but the only evidence of this is the case of Frost and Wood.33 
Only 68 patents were registered for harvesters in Ontario before 
1872, a much lower figure than for the United States (Figure 1). The 
patent holders were overwhelmingly Ontarians; only two patents 
were registered from Quebec. Ontario patent law did not permit 
Americans to take out patents. The 68 patents were held by 58 
patent holders, with a maximum of four taken out by J.Lawrence of 
Palermo. Most of the important Ontario reaper and mower com-
panies of the 1870s are represented in the patent list: Haggert, 
Watson, Sawyer, Noxon, Hall, Forsyth, Cossitt, Abell, and the 
various manufacturers at London; but well known makers like 
Massey and Harris are missing. 
Generally the patents as described in the patent records were 
"improvements" to reapers and mowers, some being designed to 
meet local conditions, like Griffith's 1851 patent for a clover seed 
gatherer. Most of the improvements were changes to the cutter bar, 
changes in the gearing and construction of the knives, the reel and 
the rake, much like American developments. Three Ontario brand 
names are mentioned in the patents but it is doubtful whether any 
of these constituted domestic product systems since they were 
probably based on American designs and parts.34 
There are three important questions in this process: how did the 
Ontario manufacturers get hold of American designs? why did 
Ontario manufacturers seek out American products? and why did 
American companies transfer products and techniques to Canada, 
without patent protection? These questions are difficult to answer 
from the official records. American companies were not granted 
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patent rights in Canada until 1872 and the U.S. Patent Office did 
not record license agreements with foreign companies so there is 
no official record of the transfer of technology. The number, con-
tent, and conditions of the transfer agreements were never made 
public. 
The reasons why Ontario manufacturers sought American licen-
ses to make harvesting machinery are spelled out clearly in the 
advice to farmers offered by L.D.Sawyer and Company in 1869: 
Avoid all newly invented or newly introduced machines. Why, Because 
you want a perfect machine, and do not want to test, perfect and intro-
duce it at your own expense. ... An invention is not always an improve-
ment. All the primary features of all Harvesters are old, and the new 
inventions are upon some minor parts of the machine, and a majority of 
them are worthless. All successful machines are the combinations of the 
inventions of many men. The valuable and important patents on Har-
vesters are owned by men who have been some years in the business, 
and no machine can be made to work successfully without using parts 
that infringe many of these patents. ... It requires several years of experi-
ment, observation and use, the study, experience and invention of many 
men, and the expenditure of many thousands of dollars, to detect all the 
faults of the best machine and apply the safe and proper remedies.35 
This catalogue entry was designed to sell the then somewhat 
outdated Ohio machine to farmers in the face of new competition, 
but buying an established product system was sounder than trying 
to develop a new design. 
Licensing was common practice within the American harvester 
industry. In addition American companies sought out licensees 
overseas in the 1850s and 1860s, particularly in Britain and 
Canada.36 A few American manufacturers, Manny and Wright, and 
Seymour and Morgan, supplied the British market from home, and 
those with licensees also sold finished machines through the local 
firms, but by 1860 all the leading American companies had licen-
sees in Britain. Beginning in 1856 machines were introduced to 
Europe. In Canada the pattern was the same. Out of the informal 
transfer of founders, patterns and capital on the North American 
industrial frontier grew a formal transfer of product systems under 
licences. This was a logical response to logistical problems in 
foundry production, the complexity of the new harvester products 
and the widespread demand for the goods. 
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The Canadian governments were gradually forced to acknow-
ledge and regulate this state of affairs. The Ontario government 
had begun to promote a domestic manufacturing system modeled 
on American and British practice through the establishment of 
societies to promote agriculture and the useful arts, mechanics' 
institutes and incentives to inventors. Experts were sent to inves-
tigate foreign industrial practices and to report on how Canada 
could obtain similar results.37 These official trips must be seen 
within the broader context of the Canadian attempt to replicate 
the American apparatus of invention. In 1857 Boards of Arts and 
Manufactures were established in both Canadas. The activities of 
these boards were overseen by the Department of Agriculture and 
Arts which had been set up in the 1850s and modeled after its U.S. 
predecessor. It began to establish "technical schools of arts" to 
teach mining, civil engineering, architecture, chemistry, designing, 
modelling, mechanical drawing and their applications to manufac-
tures and arts. A campaign of bonuses to establish mechanics' 
institutes doubled the number of institutes in Ontario from 13 to 
26 from 1868 to 1869.38 By 1872 there were 42 institutes. Through 
the institute libraries the department distributed copies of the 
Canadian Patent Recorder, and other departmental publications ad-
vertising the latest inventions and techniques. At the provincial 
fairs prizes were awarded for implements and other products. In 
Toronto 200 pupils attended evening classes organized by the 
Mechanics' Institute in 1865-66, increasing to 265 in 1868-69.39 
The Toronto courses later served as the basis for the School of 
Practical Science established in 1878.40 
In this fashion Ontario developed an explicit industrial policy 
based on the Department of Agriculture, the Patent Office, 
Mechanics' Institutes, and protective tariffs in the 1850s. The 
policy was modeled upon American institutions and at Confedera-
tion was extended from a provincial to a national policy. Jarrell has 
shown that Ontario's science policy was competitive with 
Michigan's in the nineteenth century and largely comprised ex-
penditures related to agriculture.41 The Ontario and Canadian 
governments copied the American government's entire system of 
regulating and encouraging invention except that they followed 
European practice by refusing to allow an absolute right of proper-
ty to an inventor or patent rights to foreigners. 
The Canadian government's refusal to allow American inventors 
patent rights in Canada was gradually eroded. Domestic manufac-
turers and farmers wanted American products and the way to get 
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them was through licences. In the 1850s and 1860s Canadians 
made private and official excursions to the U.S. to obtain product 
rights, and attended U.S. shows and field trials. Increasingly, spin-
off/mother-daughter plant relationships, family connections, ex-
change of personnel and copying gave way to licences. Department 
of Agriculture publications, the mechanics' institutes, fairs and 
exhibitions, the Patent Office and Department of Agriculture 
museum came to reflect the pattern of transfer. In 1872 the Patent 
Act was brought into line with reality by the Canadian govern-
ment. This way technology transfer in agricultural implements 
could be regulated and the demands of the growing number of 
domestic and foreign implement manufacturers for greater legal 
protection as licensees and licensors could be met. 
In the period to 1872 Ontario reaper and mower manufacturers 
did not differ organizationally and technologically from most 
American producers. There was little domestic innovation and 
virtually all of it was based on American machines, but this is not 
distinctive. Coming late to the harvester industry, Ontario 
manufacturers followed American developments as they built up 
their own experience in the products. Licensing, because of the 
small scale of factories, the regional character of distribution and 
the nature of licensing, resulted in an open market in technol-
ogy characterized by technology transfer. Indeed the change in 
the patent law in 1872 was specifically designed to regulate this 
transfer in such a way as to promote domestic technical 
capability. 
5. THE PATENT ACT OF 1872 
In 1872 the Canadian patent law was revised to allow foreigners to 
hold patents in Canada, although the rights granted were exten-
sively qualified. No patent was to be issued if it compromised 
existing Canadian producers. The foreigner had to take out a 
patent within 12 months of application in his home country. Any 
Canadian manufacturer manufacturing the product within the 12 
month period had the right to continue. The most onerous restric-
tion required the product to be manufactured in Canada within 
two years, with no imports allowed after 12 months. Some exten-
sions were later permitted by the Commissioner of Patents, espe-
cially on large equipment with limited or custom markets.42 
While the effect of the new law may have been to encourage the 
transfer of technology to Canada, the Canadian government was 
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aware of this problem. It wished to avoid the patent monopolies 
characteristic of the U.S. technology market and to preserve a large 
number of Canadian manufacturers. The changes were only a 
modification of the basic Canadian position: invention should be 
given protection and monopoly rights only when it resulted in the 
manufacture of useful products in Canada for Canadians. In 1872 
it was officially acknowledged that licences could fulfil this objec-
tive. 
That fundamental differences remained between the American 
and Canadian patent laws became evident as the precise nature of 
patent claims for precedence on complex reapers and mowers was 
finally confronted. Naylor has claimed that there were no patent 
law cases over infringement of patent rights on harvesters until 
1885.43 In fact, there were infringement cases before 1885 but 
generally they were suits between patentee and licensee, not be-
tween two licensees or between two Canadian patent holders. This 
stands in marked contrast to the situation in the U.S. where the 
McCormick case of 1847 was only the most celebrated of a long 
litany of suits between patent holders. The Canadian Parliament 
refused to make a patent into an absolute property in all its conse-
quences. This effectively avoided the U.S. patent wars. 
This interpretation is not the same as Naylor's.44 Naylor 
viewed the 1872 Patent Act as an attempt to encourage transfer 
of American techniques to Canada. To my mind this was only an 
incidental result of the change in the law, which was primarily 
designed to promote Canadian invention and maintain a rela-
tively free market in inventions within Canada. American licen-
ces had been offered to Canadian manufacturers since the late 
1850s despite a lack of patent protection, and the 1872 law 
sought to regulate this situation while imposing onerous condi-
tions (by American standards) on the American patent holders. 
These conditions were directly in line with European practice. 
European nations, intent upon fostering domestic innovations, 
applied restrictions to foreign patent holders similar to those 
scheduled in the Canadian law of 1872. At international patent 
law conferences American interests lobbied for a freer, stand-
ardized international market for innovations.45 Like many 
European patent laws, the new Canadian law was designed to 
control and regulate foreign techniques and property rights, 
rather than to encourage and solicit them. After 1872 the 
Department of Agriculture sent no more agents to the U.S.A. and 
Britain to obtain machines, models and licences. 
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But regardless of this interpretation, the question is whether 
Naylor's conclusion is accurate: did the policy result in "the sub-
mergence of Canadian innovative capacity under a flood of 
American-imported techniques."?46 Did the extension of condi-
tional patent rights to Americans in 1872 change the nature of the 
cross border technology transfer? Did it compromise Canadian 
innovative capacity or was the basic pattern of technology transfer 
characteristic of early licensing perpetuated within the framework 
of harvester product development? 
6. INNOVATION IN THE ONTARIO 
HARVESTER INDUSTRY AFTER 1872 
Immediately after the 1872 change to the patent law American 
inventions began to enter the patent lists (Figure 3). Through to 
1890 American patentees accounted for about half of the patents 
on harvesting machinery in any one year. The actual number of 
assignments to Canadian manufacturers was much smaller. In fact 
it is impossible to determine from the Canadian patent records 
how many licenses were granted.47 It became common practice to 
take out a patent in Canada in order to advertise the invention to 
prospective Canadian manufacturers. American farmers, for ex-
ample, registered patents in the hope of attracting Canadian inves-
tors. Most U.S. registrations were made by American 
manufacturers. Some of them were direct assignments to local 
manufacturers, some were joint registrations with Canadians, 
others protected early joint ventures and the one branch plant, but 
many patents were never manufactured in Canada. Consequently 
the large number of American patent registrations identified by 
Naylor leaves the true status of Canadian innovation unknown and 
overstates the place of American product technology in Canada.48 
Naylor takes the increasing number of American patents as a sign 
of growing technological dependence: the submergence of 
Canadian innovation under a deluge of American technique. 
Whatever the merits of Naylor's case for a variety of industries in the 
twentieth century, in the mid to late nineteenth century we must be 
very careful how we interpret the rising number of American patent 
holders in the Canadian lists in this industry. Until the twentieth 
century there were only three branch plants - two short-lived har-
vester plants and a parts manufacturer - in Ontario and local 
manufacturers performed the full range of manufacturing functions, 
including construction of capital equipment. Truncation, which 
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refers to an industry or firm reliant on foreign sources for many of 
the manufacturing sources, is not an appropriate term for this 
industry in this period. 
But the surprising thing about the patent record in this industry 
is the number of Canadian patents. Despite a slow start, Ontario 
companies increased their share of North American patent activity 
in the late 1870s and in the 1880s (Figure 1). All the Ontario 
companies were represented in this activity. Indeed the Canadian 
patents taper off at the same time as American ones, indicating the 
same product cycle. By breaking down the harvester patents into 
classes of machine - reapers and mowers, self-rake reapers, knives 
and cutter bars for reapers, harvesters and binders, knife shar-
peners, wire and twine making and attachments (Figure 4) -
another pattern is revealed. The first Canadian patent on a self-rake 
machine was taken out in 1864, although Ontario manufacturers 
only began to make self-rakes in earnest at the end of the decade. 
Until 1876 there were no Canadian patents relating to harvesters 
and binders but this coincides with development of wire binders. 
So although there was a lag between American and Canadian 
patent activity on particular machine types, the lag time appears to 
have become shorter. By 1882 most of the patents were for aspects 
of harvesters and binders. 
At first glance this indicates a flowering of Canadian inventive 
activity, but the Canadian patent record cannot be taken at face 
value. The increase in Canadian patents might be a large number of 
Canadian farmers reinventing the harvester, or patents taken out 
by the skilled workers of Canadian companies. The innovations 
may have constituted new harvester designs or improvements on 
old American designs or Canadian attempts to reproduce American 
harvester developments but under Canadian control. Each of these 
possibilities has different implications for our appraisal of 
Canadian innovation. Similarly, the fact that a large number of 
American patents were registered does not necessarily mean that 
these were all produced in Ontario. Taken on their own the total 
number of patents will not reveal the true status of Canadian 
innovation. 
In order to resolve these ambiguities company product histories 
of Ontario firms and their connections with American product 
systems will be examined in detail. In the harvester industry the 
pinnacle of technical development was the perfection of a product 
system which was licensed to other manufacturers, and the 
development of an in-house innovative capacity which allowed 
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further development of the product system along the general lines 
of the industry with the minimum amount of external assistance. 
Effective technology transfer occurred when the licensee no longer 
paid royalties but generated product developments on its own. The 
A. Harris, Son and Company certainly meets these criteria, even 
though it enjoyed a close relationship with an American licensor. 
7. A. HARRIS, SON AND COMPANY AND 
THE D.M.OSBORNE CONNECTION 
D.M.Osborne and Company of Auburn, New York maintained a 
long and close association with A. Harris, Son and Company. The 
relationship is interesting because it appears that in the early 1880s 
Alanson Harris's son John was directly involved in developing a 
binder produced both by Osborne and Harris. The case represents 
the pinnacle of Ontario harvester innovation. The Harris company 
was one of the most innovative Ontario firms, for unlike the 
Massey Manufacturing Company it contributed to the develop-
ment of its own twine binder, and built up a strong engineering 
department in the early 1880s. 
Harris began making mowers in 1862 and introduced a hand-
rake reaper in 1867 and a self-rake reaper in 1869. But their first 
patent on harvesters was not until 1875. In the period 1875-1892 
the company came up with 10 patents on harvesters under the 
names of Alanson Harris, John Harris, Lyman Melvin-Jones, the 
superintendent, and J.Wedlake and J.Lucas who were skilled 
workers. This indicates the development of some innovative 
capability within the firm. This capability was seriously under-
mined by the death of John Harris in 1887. The company also 
obtained assignments from other firms and individuals around the 
industry. The patents were for changes to the frames, guards, rake 
adjustment, bundle carriers, coupling bars and drive gears of 
mowers, harvesters and reapers. These were improvements to the 
existing designs rather than major changes to the machines. The 
machines themselves were built according to the D.M.Osborne and 
Company Patents. Despite licence agreements extending back to 
1862, Osborne could not take out his first Canadian patent until 
1873. Thereafter patents related to harvesters, reapers and mowers 
were registered under the Osborne company's name until 1887. 
After 1890 the patents were for corn harvesters and disc harrows as 
harvester development was complete. The Osborne patents were 
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derived from various American sources, but this is by no means 
remarkable. 
Invariably there was a delay involved in transferring the Os-
borne product innovations to the Harris company. The Kirby 
mower was first produced at Auburn, New York in 185749 but was 
not licensed to Harris until 1862 (when D.M.Osborne took on new 
partners at Auburn). The New York factory was making a hand-rake 
reaper in 1866 but Harris was licensed in 1867. Osborne went on an 
extensive European tour in 1872 seeking licensees. In 1875 
D.M.Osborne and Company absorbed the Cayuga Chief Manufac-
turing Company headed by Cyrenus Wheeler and the Wheeler 
combined machine was added to the Osborne product line. These 
machines appeared in the Harris line after the registration of the 
Wheeler patents in Canada in 1877. Osborne took out rights to the 
Gordon wire binder in 1876 and in 1877 began manufacture of 
wire binders. Harris sold the Osborne wire binder in the Canadian 
west in 1878 or 1879,50 and continued to produce Osborne mowers 
in the 1880s. 
Harris paid royalties to Osborne for the right to produce his 
machines. The account books of the Harris firm for 1873-1887 
reveal peak payments in the period 1875-1882 with a dramatic 
reduction thereafter (Table 2). The account covers both royalties 
and payments for parts imported from Auburn, New York, but it is 
not possible to separate these items out except for the period 
1884-1887 when only $2,500 was paid in royalties. The dramatic 
increase in payments from 1874 to 1876 coincides with the intro-
duction of the new Osborne mower and Wheeler combined reaper-
mower (Table 2). The payment of $48,185 in 1876 must have 
covered the rights to these machines for after that date payments 
were very small. Indeed compared to the company's wage account 
the payments to Osborne became increasingly insignificant. The 
main reason for this decline was the switch in cutter bar sourcing 
to a plant in St. Catharines, Ontario. This factory was originally 
established by two Canadians but was purchased by the Whitman 
and Barnes Company, making it the only important U.S. branch 
plant in the nineteenth century. Whitman and Barnes supplied 
cutter bar parts to virtually every U.S. and Canadian harvesting 
machinery manufacturer in the 1880s. There was also a general 
shift in inputs to Canadian and particularly Ontario sourcing 
(Table 3). The Osborne patents of 1877 were only taken out for 5 
years and by 1883 Harris was paying very little in the way of 
royalties. In the Harris case, the cost of the American techniques 
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Table 3 
A. Harris, Son and Company Accounts: 
Origins of Good Received 1875 and 1885. 
1875 1885 
State or Dollar Per Cent Dollar Per Cent 
Province Value of Total Value of Total 
Britain - - 448 0.2 
N.Y. 17,919 62.0 11,555 4.7 
NJ. 666 2.3 85 0.0 
Mass. 455 1.6 1,413 0.6 
Ct. - - 347 0.1 
R.I. - - 255 0.1 
Pa. - - 1,381 0.6 
Ohio 330 1.2 7,727 3.1 
111. _ _ 773 0.3 
U.S.A. 19,171 67.1 23,539 9.6 
Que. 3,461 12.1 48,292 19.6 
N.S. - - 10,488 4.2 
Ont. 5,806 20.3 163,056 66.3 
Man. 117 0.5 
Canada 9,384 32.9 221,836 90.2 
Total 28,556 100.0 245,823 100.0 
Note: The dollar values have not been adjusted. In 1885 cord wood 
comprised $58,092 of the Ontario purchases and payments 
to Whitman and Barnes Mfg. Co. a further $48,957, but this 
leaves a further $56,007 (22.8%) worth of other materials 
purchased in Ontario. 
Sources: A. Harris, Son and Company, Account Books, 1872-1887, Massey 
Ferguson Collection, Ontario Agricultural Museum. 
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Table 2 
The A. Harris & Company Account Books 1873-1887: 
The D.M. Osborne and Company Account 
and the Wages Account. 
Year Payments to Wages Payments to 
D.M. Osborne Account Whitman & Barnes 
&Co. ($) ($) Mfg. Co. ($) 
1872 _ 408.26 _ 
1873 8,092.57 12,513.49 -
1874 9,486.23 13,370.53 -
1875 15,528.41 18,995.21 -
1876 48,185.94 19,331.37 -
1877 15,662.06 18,455.25 -
1878 16,605.06 24,800.34 -
1879 25,001.35 26,807.51 -
1880 25,399.31 38,701.18 -
1881 - - -
1882 18,182.64 52,543.59 19,182.94 
1883 5,659.94 92,786.77 47,581.41 
1884 2,571.45 78,265.83 32,052.53 
1885 2,782.85 82,915.74 48,956.94 
1886 445.63 95,735.30 35,418.65 
1887 217.32 101,537.13 42,063.13 
Note: The company moved to new factories in 1872 and 1881 and so 
there is no date for these years. 
Source: A. Harris, Son & Co., Account Books, 1872-1887, Massey-Ferguson 
Collection, Ontario Agricultural Museum. 
became less important to the Canadian company as production 
increased. Payments to Osborne represented 15 per cent of sales 
value in 1875, but less than 1 per cent in 1885. Production costs 
and royalty payments together, however, comprised 60 per cent of 
Harris' sales in 1875, but 78 per cent in 1885. The share of sales Harris 
took as net profit was cut in half over this decade. The difference is 
largely attributable to the shift to the more complicated harvester 
binders in the 1880s, increasing materials costs and increasing com-
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petition in the Ontario market. These were far more important 
considerations for Harris than the costs of royalty payments. 
Royalty payments in North America were usually set between 5 
and 15 dollars per machine in the 1870s, depending upon the 
bargaining strengths of the parties, but it is difficult to establish 
their general effect on the profitability of firms. From 1865 to 1872 
McCormick self-rake reapers had an average sale price of $200, and 
mowers sold for $130. McCormick made a net profit of $55 per 
machine or 35 per cent of the value of sales.51 Other U.S. companies 
did not do so well. Their selling prices were $20 below McCormick's 
and their costs of production were probably higher. This suggests 
that the net profit of companies paying royalties must have been 
half McCormick's 35 per cent. For a small manufacturer with a 
local sales territory this might still be competitive. With a net profit 
of nearly 40 per cent in 1875 Harris did extraordinarily well. 
In the late 1870s the situation for Harris and other small 
manufacturers must have remained about the same. McCormick's 
manufacturing costs per machine declined from $62 in 1876 to $38 
in 1879. Declining materials costs are partly responsible but the 
figures would be higher if binders, introduced in 1878, were not 
counted as separate machines.52 These were also depression years 
and the prices of machines were reduced. It was in the 1880s that 
Harris and other small manufacturers, particularly those paying 
royalties, began to be uncompetitive. All manufacturers faced 
higher costs of production,53 and the new twine binders introduced 
stiff competition to the market, all of which must have cut into the 
profit margins of small firms manufacturing under licence. But 
until the mid 1880s, companies paying royalty fees remained com-
petitive, especially if they sold in a small, protected market. 
From the point of view of the firm granting the license, instead 
of paying tariffs and transport costs, arranging a sales organization 
and perhaps a branch plant, a constant stream of earnings, probab-
ly equivalent to or higher than the profits obtainable from direct 
sales, was received at no risk. Licensing could quickly extend the 
company's sales territory and provide income for domestic expan-
sion. It also ensured market coverage and recognition of patent 
rights. The Osborne-Harris relationship represents long term co-
operation with advantages for both parties. The true value of the 
relationship can be seen by examining the extent to which Harris 
became innovative. 
It has been claimed that, after a visit to the American west in 
1881, John Harris developed a twine binder with a steel frame and 
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the Appleby knotter: the "Brantford Binder" which the company 
first made in 1882.54 Harris was granted a Canadian patent related 
to binders in 1885, and his first American patent for binders was 
registered in 1886.55 Denison further claims that 
A large American implement company paid the Canadian concern an un-
precedented compliment by purchasing a complete set of patterns [for 
the Brantford Binder]56 
There is no record of such a payment in the company's account 
books, although this does not disprove Denison's claim: there is a 
gap in the account books occasioned by the building of the new 
Harris plant in 1881, and a transaction may have occurred private-
iy. 
John Harris was involved in binder development, but exactly 
what the status of his contribution was is unclear. The most likely 
scenario is that Harris collaborated with Osborne in the develop-
ment of harvesters and binders. Several things support this view. 
The Harris company had access to the Gordon wire binder patents 
through D.M.Osborne, but Osborne was slow to acquire rights to 
the Appleby or Gorham twine binder patents and in the meantime 
experimented with his own designs. He built twine binders for 
three years before he obtained a shop right (the right to manufac-
ture the design in one factory) from Appleby in 1883, and during 
those three years, as well as after, Osborne relied heavily on his 
own patents for protection in twine binders.57 Harris was able to 
defeat an infringement suit launched by the Gurneys based on 
claims of infringement of the Appleby patents. The Canadian 
patents taken out by Harris do not cover many aspects of harvester 
and binder construction but the two companies appear to have 
brought out twine binders at the same time and to have produced 
identical machines in the 1880s.58 The Harris and Osborne com-
panies appear to have collaborated on the development of twine 
binders in the face of the most successful attempt at a patent ring 
in harvesting machinery. 
Despite the uncertainty over John Harris' role in binder develop-
ment, there is undoubtedly truth to the implication of Denison's 
claim: A. Harris, Son and Company was quite innovative. The 
company's technical capabilities are confirmed by the introduction 
of the open-end binder in 1890. This improvement was introduced 
by the Brantford company, but it was by no means an important 
innovation. Denison described it in these terms: 
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Although Harris actually produced the first practical machine that would 
handle straw of every length, existing patents, some of which had been 
granted back in the days of early experiment, covered every feature and 
made the prospect of successful litigation negligible. ... The mechanical 
difference between the original "closed back" and the succeeding "open-
end" or "wide-open" binder now seems trivial."59 
All it required was a change in the alignment of the chain drive for 
the canvas and the elimination of the backboard. The idea was to 
allow straw to be cut to any length so as to increase the amount of 
straw available as fodder for cattle. This improvement was specifi-
cally designed for the British and European markets and two 
English manufacturers began producing the improvement. As an 
improvement it possesses all the usual features: problems with 
prior claims, rapid transmission through the industry, particular 
regional appeal, and modification to an existing machine. 
The Harris company displayed signs of an emerging technical 
capability, a group of skilled workers registering patents, simul-
taneous introduction of the twine binder with a leading American 
company, and at least one acknowledged innovation, even if it was 
not of major importance. This capability was developed late in 
harvester development and for most of the company's history it 
followed the product developments initiated by its licensor. This 
relationship involved payments for royalties and parts, and Harris 
was not permitted to export to the U.S. This did not prevent the 
Canadian company from expanding sales throughout Canada and 
overseas. Nor did it prevent the company from product develop-
ment on its own and in collaboration with the licensor. The 
company's switch in cutter bar sourcing to Whitman and Barnes, 
and the general shift to Ontario sources of materials indicates the 
emergence of a domestic infrastructure for harvester manufacture. 
The Harris case provides strong evidence for effective technology 
transfer as a result of licensing, both to the company itself and to 
the emerging Ontario industry. 
8. THE CASE IN CONTEXT: 
THE ONTARIO HARVESTER INDUSTRY IN THE 1880S 
A. Harris, Son and Company was not an isolated case. Most of the 
other Ontario companies introduced patents covering improve-
ments to reapers and mowers, switched to Ontario sources of parts, 
and at least one other company developed an engineering depart-
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ment, but generally Harris was ahead of the pack. Apart from 
Harris, 14 other Ontario companies made the transition to har-
vester and binder manufacture, but most of these firms obtained 
licences from the large American companies. Four companies 
licensed by McCormick to make wire binders escaped from the 
royalty payments because McCormick failed to register his patents 
properly in Canada. Patent activity did not add up to an ability to 
develop products on their own. The Ontario industry had several 
firms which managed to procure new products despite poor 
relationships with American licensors, others which made the tran-
sition to harvesters and binders thanks to licences, and many 
which, despite efforts of their own, were unable to develop the new 
machines. A brief discussion of some of these firms will indicate 
the overall pattern of Ontario innovation. 
John Watson and Company of Ayr made reaper and mower 
improvements, and took out patents on a binder.60 John Watson 
himself took out a very early patent for improvements to the Wood 
mower, but later introduced Johnson's self-rake to his combined 
machines. Further improvements registered at the patent office 
appear to have been the result of, at best, collaboration between 
Watson and his staff and the Sweet brothers of New York. After 
what must have been unfruitful attempts to develop his own har-
vester and binder, Watson turned to the Deering twine binder in 
1886, which incorporated a steel frame and the Appleby knotter. 
Unable to secure a long and close relationship with any American 
harvester company, Watson worked hard to develop his own 
machines. This is testimony to Watson's own technical abilities. 
However, the firm did not develop a pool of talented workers so, on 
the death of its founder, it was forced to move to products for 
which it could obtain licenses - washing machines, churns and 
warehouse trucks. The Watson company failed to develop an en-
gineering department and thus failed to sustain what appears to 
have been a reasonably innovative record. 
Until the amalgamation with Harris, the Massey Manufacturing 
Company was responsible for just ten patents mostly registered in 
the 1880s. Massey did not develop its own combined reaper and 
mower or binder despite its claim to the earliest Canadian har-
vester patent. It built under the Whiteley patents, which it secured 
in 1881 by buying out the Toronto Reaper and Mower Company. 
This company produced the Champion combined reaper-mower 
and after 1882 Massey continued to receive new Whiteley patents, 
including those for the new Champion twine binder. 
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During the 1880s Massey developed its own innovative 
capability as J.McLachlan of London and five Massey workers 
registered patents for the company. McLachlan, who patented im-
provements on binders for John Elliott and Sons in the 1880s, had 
an impressive record as a patentee. The new Massey-Harris com-
pany combined the inventive talents of these men with the staff of 
the Harris, Verity and Patterson works in the Canadian industry's 
first official engineering department. All the subsequent patents 
taken out by Massey-Harris to 1914, except a few for cream 
separators and a lawn mower, came out of this engineering depart-
ment (Figure 5), which represents the ultimate achievement of 
technology transfer under American licensing in Canada. Massey-
Harris tried to develop its own products rather than rely on further 
licences. The department devoted most of its attention to grain 
drills, corn harvesters and ploughs. This narrow product range 
indicates the weakness of the department: there were no patents on 
gasoline engines, tractors or other related products and only one 
patent on a production process. Developments in steel cutting and 
moulding, and new labour management techniques were bor-
rowed from the U.S. F.W. Taylor's systematic management techni-
ques were not introduced into Ontario metal manufacturing shops 
until the 1900s.61 International Harvester's branch plant was in fact 
instrumental in introducing these techniques to Ontario. Even 
then Massey-Harris moved into the new products of the twentieth 
century by purchasing American plants with established product 
designs and engineering departments. The new techniques and the 
new products came with foreign direct investment or were avail-
able only to Canadian corporations. In addition to the achieve-
ments of Massey and Harris several harvester parts suppliers 
emerged in Ontario, showing the importance of licensing in 
developing domestic parts supply. At St. Catharines a Canadian 
firm began making reaper and mower knives and cutter bars in 
1872. By 1879 it was producing $60,000 to $70,000 worth of knives 
for Canadian harvester manufacturers. In that year the company 
was bought by the American monopoly in reaper knives, Whitman 
and Barnes. The company provided virtually every Canadian 
manufacturer with knives until the 1890s.62 Peter Hay of Gait took 
out patents for machine knife cutting and sharpening tools. His 
company, established in 1883, was a purely local affair.63 In addi-
tion to these two knife and cutter bar manufacturers several malle-
able iron works, notably the Oshawa Malleable Iron Works owned 
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Figure 5 
Canadian Patents of the Massey and Massey-Harris Companies 1875-1900. 
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by Joseph Hall, were established to produce malleable iron finger 
bars for the cutting apparatus of reapers and mowers. 
A number of companies moved towards specialist manufactur-
ing but were handicapped by poor connections with licensors, 
conservative management, slow expansion of sales organizations 
and problems moving to steel construction. Noxon, Watson, John 
Elliott and Sons of London, Frost and Wood of Smith's Falls, D. 
Maxwell of Paris and Haggert of Brampton all fall into this 
category. Surprisingly the Canadian Binder Manufacturers' Associa-
tion numbered 15 members in 1885, so half of the 31 firms making 
harvesting machinery in 32 establishments gained access to har-
vester-binder technology and patent rights. The Toronto Reaper 
and Mower Company, the only branch plant prior to 1901, and the 
two joint ventures, the North American Agricultural Implements 
and General Manufacturing Company of London and the Joseph 
Hall Manufacturing Company, had no domestic patent record. 
Apart from these three firms every one of the Binder Association's 
members took out patents on harvesters in the 1880s. 
Certain individuals were involved in binder development. Two 
Canadians, J.M.Currier of Ottawa and E.C.Eells of London, bought 
into the Gordon wire binder patents, but their investment was 
intended to earn a weighty return from the sale of patent rights in 
the U.S. By the 1880s Canadian manufacturers were registering 
patents in the United States: David Maxwell claimed that Mc-
Cormick purchased the U.S. patent rights to his low-down binder 
introduced to the Manitoba trade in 1884, for $105,000; and 
George Pye of Ottawa took out a U.S. patent on reaping and 
mowing machines.64 J.McLachlan of London took out binder 
patents in Canada, but he was one of a very few. 
These were the chief success stories. The failures of the licensing 
regime lie in the problems encountered by general foundries trying 
to move beyond reaper and mower production to harvesters after 
1880. Many of these firms failed to develop their own product and 
in most cases they were unable to find a licensor. The usual practice 
was to move out of harvesters altogether and concentrate on other 
foundry lines: threshers and separators, traction engines, and 
washing machines.65 The general foundries tended to remain 
general foundries. 
One of the earliest cases of this pattern was J.Hall's abandon-
ment of reaper production in the 1870s. Hall made Ball's "Ohio" 
reapers and mowers under license in the 1860s and early 1870s, 
and then secured a license to build "Champion" machines from 
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the William Whiteley organization of Ohio in 1875 after six years 
of negotiation.66 Whiteley invested in the Hall company, and chan-
ges were made at the works, including the construction of 
Ontario's first malleable iron works to make finger bars. The joint 
venture allowed Hall to specialize in reaper and mower production, 
but Whiteley abandoned the venture in order to establish the 
Toronto Reaper and Mower Company in 1877.67 The Hall company, 
its future seemingly assured in 1875, returned to general imple-
ment production, focusing on the threshing machinery market. By 
1887 the company was bankrupt.68 Without the American connec-
tion, and especially the profits that would have accrued from the 
new combined machines and harvester-binders developed by 
Whiteley, the Joseph Hall Company was forced out of the harvester 
market and eventually out of business. This demonstrates the im-
portance of American licences to Ontario firms as well as the 
versatility of the foundry shop in switching products. 
The era of licences ended in 1890, with the last known harvester 
licence going to the Noxon brothers from Seiberling of Ohio in 
that year. Apart from the transfer of a corn harvester from D.M. 
Osborne, Massey-Harris received no new licenses after 1890. With 
standardization of harvester design by 1890 Ontario firms which 
already made harvesters and binders did not require further tech-
nology transfer for these products. With competition between the 
leading firms taking place on a continental basis there was less 
incentive for American companies to grant local licences. The 
amalgamation of the eight leading harvester companies into I.H.C. 
in 1902 further reduced the field of companies from which licenses 
could be obtained. Only 2 new firms were started in Ontario after 
1885 and by 1900 only 8 of the 31 harvesting machinery com-
panies in 1885 remained in the business. The firms which did not 
enter harvester manufacture before 1885 found it difficult to do so 
afterwards, because of their lack of access to technology and be-
cause of the intense competition in the industry. 
It is testimony to effective technology transfer that, in such 
complex products as harvesting machinery, at least two Ontario 
manufacturers emerged in the late 1870s and in the 1880s with the 
ability to follow American improvements through their own en-
gineering efforts and at least under their own patent control. But 
there was a depth of technological development behind these 
industry leaders. All together 15 companies produced binders in 
Canada before 1900. That so many firms were able to acquire 
binder patent rights is surprising since, in this product, the window 
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of opportunity for small firms and late starters was virtually closed 
by 1885. A half dozen of these firms claimed to have contributed 
their own innovations and designs to their products. In harvesters 
a manufacturing industry was developed in Ontario which dis-
played innovative capabilities in keeping with what we should 
expect of American implement manufacturers and certainly ahead 
of comparable American late followers. Despite its late start the 
Canadian industry profited from technology transfer and by the 
1880s was beginning to produce its own product innovations. 
9. CONCLUSION: LICENCES, PATENT LAWS 
AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
The Ontario harvester industry grew out of the moving frontier 
of foundry operations in North America. From the beginning it was 
part of a transfer of techniques, personnel and equipment from the 
state of New York west across the continent. In the 1850s reapers 
and mowers were developed as complete product systems in New 
York, Ohio and Illinois. These products commanded wide markets 
which no single manufacturer could supply and it became com-
mon practice to license other local manufacturers to produce for a 
specified sales territory. American companies also licensed British 
and Ontario plants in the mid 1850s. Licences were granted as part 
of the general expansion programmes of American companies. 
They were granted despite the Canadian governments' refusal to 
allow foreigners to hold patent rights. Indeed, licences reflected the 
fundamental principle of Canadian patent law: that there should 
be no absolute property right on invention. Licences were an 
effective way of avoiding the risks and costs associated with selling 
in distant territories while still retaining some control over the 
product and a portion of the profits. 
Ontario manufacturers introduced American reapers, mowers 
and harvesters into Canada through a succession of licensing 
agreements. The result was that Canadian farmers bought 
Canadian-made American machines to harvest their crops. Ontario 
manufacturers paid royalties to and bought parts from American 
companies. They also faced a restriction on their sales area: they 
could not sell in the U.S. Product development was also conducted 
along American lines. 
In a fundamental way, Canadian producers were dependent on 
American sources for product and process technologies. They paid 
licence fees to U.S. patent owners, bought parts from a U.S. owned 
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branch plant, and made U.S. machines with minor modifications. 
They had to position themselves carefully in the market for tech-
nology, which was a U.S. market, dominated by U.S. firms through 
litigation in U.S. courts. But this apparent domination of the On-
tario harvester industry by American product systems should not 
be overstated. 
Licences could lead to indigenous technical ability and in the 
long term could produce independent, innovative firms. Licensing 
and joint ventures were not like branch plants. Licensing presented 
a window of opportunity, limited by the product cycle and the 
shift to corporate organization, for technology transfer into 
Canada. Massey-Harris represented the achievement from this 
transfer. Canadian patent law was specifically designed to en-
courage domestic invention and to qualify the rights of all foreign 
inventors. It was in keeping with the small scale, multi-plant in-
dustrial organization of the early nineteenth century and the 
thinking behind the departments of agriculture, boards of industry 
and arts, mechanics institutes and expositions which characterized 
nineteenth century industrial policy. 
There was effective technology transfer to Ontario companies. 
By the late 1870s Ontarians were patenting innovations on 
American designs. The chief successes were the development of a 
twine binder and a group of skilled workers responsible for innova-
tions by A. Harris, Son and Company, John Watson's attempt to 
build a harvester, the creation of an engineering department at 
Massey-Harris in 1892, and J.McLachlan's patent activity in Lon-
don. Most of the patents taken out by Ontario companies do not 
represent important or even original innovations, but they do 
represent attempts to claim ownership of product rights inde-
pendent of licences. The Ontario industry developed an American 
style innovative capability in harvesters by 1875. Unfortunately 
this came late in the development of harvesters so no Canadian 
product systems can be identified, and there are no cases of 
Canadian firms licensing American companies - with the doubtful 
exceptions of Harris and Maxwell. The late start of the Canadian 
industry produced dependency relations but, of course, not all U.S. 
firms were technology leaders and the open market for technology 
and parts supported the operations of all U.S. manufacturers, in-
cluding the majors. Canadian manufacturers were part of a U.S. 
production system but this does not constitute technological de-
pendence in the senses that Williams and Naylor use. Ontario 
harvesting machinery firms were innovative and quickly ceased to 
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rent U.S. technology through licenses and branch plants. They 
should not be characterized as an inferior "instant industry" only 
intent upon renting U.S. technology. Until the establishment of 
the I.H.C. branch plant in 1903, no U.S. company was able to 
operate a successful branch plant to produce finished machines in 
Ontario. Canadian firms were late starters and therefore dependent 
on other foreign firms for technology, but this did not, inevitably, 
lead to domination by foreign companies through branch plants. 
Rather the branch plant economy that emerged after 1900 was the 
result of innovations which undermined both U.S. and Canadian 
producers because they were tied to new business institutions and 
were introduced without reference to the existing technology 
market. 
The development sequence which has been described for 
reapers, mowers, harvesters and binders did not occur for all farm 
machinery products and sectors. In traction engines and threshers 
there were few licences, and domestic innovation began much 
earlier and was much stronger. It was also not the case in products 
of the twentieth century: tractors, combines and internal combus-
tion engines. Changes in industrial organization and different 
production techniques meant that these products were difficult for 
Canadian firms to perfect and were transferred into Canada 
without reference to Canadian licensees. There were limits to the 
industries to which licensing was applicable and to the period over 
which licensing lasted. 
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inventions were patented; legal costs and fees may have deterred inven-
tors from patenting; some inventors did not want the publicity entailed 
in patent issue; inventions were not of equal quality or economic 
importance; not all patents were worked so they do not necessarily 
measure innovation; and the patent office classification relates to tech-
nical not economic considerations. The Patent Office recorded patents 
date of issue and in this work all dates refer to the year of issue. J.Lee, 
"Inventive Activity in Southern Ontario, 1881-1911/' in D.RWalker 
and J.H.Bater (eds.), 1974, Industrial Development in Southern Ontario, 
Department of Geography Publication Series, No. 3, University of 
Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, 1974, 4-5. 
3 R.L.Ardrey, 1894, American Agricultural Implements: A Review of Invention 
and Development in the Agricultural Implements Industry of the United 
States, Chicago, and L.Rogin, 1931, The Introduction of Farm Machinery in 
its Relation to the Productivity of Labor in the Agriculture of the United States 
During the Nineteenth Century, New York, reprinted. These are the stand-
ard works and the following description is based upon their works. 
4 These machines were based upon the Sylla and Adams hinged bar 
patent of 1853 and the later work of Kirby, Forbush, Whiteley and 
others. Most of the important patents related to hinged bar mowers 
were pooled in the Hinged Bar Mower Pool. 
5 For example, "During the late 1840s and throughout the 1850s, the 
McCormicks changed virtually every part of the reaper from year to 
year." D.Hounshell, 1984, From the American System to Mass Production, 
Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 159. 
6 Neither Ardrey nor Rogin regarded the celebrated controversy over who 
invented the reaper as a useful question. The trial, the subsequent 
propaganda and later discussion have highlighted the actual nature of 
innovation in the industry (innovation as an incremental process) 
while also revealing McCormick's attempts at patent monopoly. 
R.L.Ardrey, American Agricultural Implements, op. cit. pp. 4-47, 78-93 
especially 41-47; L.Rogin, The Introduction of Farm Machinery, op. cit. pp. 
73-74; C.McCormick, 1931, The Century of the Reaper, Boston, pp. 17-28; 
H.Casson, 1908, The Romance of the Reaper, New York; J.F.Steward, 1909, 
The Reaper: A History of the Efforts of Those Who Justly May Said To Have 
Made Bread Cheap, New York, pp. 96-148; J.Pekar, "The Patent System 
and Agricultural Equipment/' Society of Automotive Engineers, 1980, 
An Historical Perspective of Farm Machinery, SP-470, Warrendale, Pennsyl-
vania, pp. 31-33. 
7 A Vicas, 1970, Research and Development in the Farm Machinery Industry, 
Royal Commission on Farm Machinery, Ottawa, p. 3. 
80 Technology in the Ontario Harvester Industry 
8 For example the vast majority of implement patents related to churns. 
On average a churn patent was taken out once every ten or twelve days 
in the U.S. during the nineteenth century. In other lines farmers were 
also important, but not so in reapers and mowers. Shannon lists the 
number of patents registered in the U.S. to 1899 as 12,519 on har-
vesters, 12,652 on ploughs, 9,156 on seeders and planters, 5,801 on 
harrows and diggers, and 5,319 on thrashers. There were other patents 
on dairy equipment, fences, vegetable cutters, fertilizer and other items. 
F.Shannon, 1945, Farmer's Last Frontier, 1945, p. 138-139. 
9 Both Hussey and McCormick encountered difficulties when they tried 
to produce their designs and both licensed foundries to make their 
products on a regional basis in the 1840s. This resulted in the diffusion 
of the basic product technology to several small facilities. L.Rogin, The 
Introduction of Farm Machinery, op. cit., p. 78. 
10 This insight was previously reached by John Weaver, 1982, Hamilton: 
An Illustrated History, Toronto, James Lorimer, and n.d., "The Location 
of Manufacturing Enterprises: The Case of Hamilton's Attraction of 
Foundries, 1830-1890", unpublished paper, Ontario Agricultural 
Museum. Other authors have described the process. See especially Paul 
Johnson, 1978, The Shopkeeper's Millennium: Society and Revivals in 
Rochester New York, 1815-1837, New York, which describes appren-
ticeship in the frontier Rochester of the 1830s; and M.Katz, 1975, 
Hamilton: The People of Canada West, Cambridge, Massachusetts. For 
similar relationships in the textile industry, see RScranton, 1983, 
Proprietorial Capitalism: The Textile Manufacture at Philadelphia 1800-
1885, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, and in the iron and steel 
industry, J.Ingram, 1978, The Iron Barons, Westport, Connecticut. It is 
also worth noting the effect of the passing of the frontier. Other authors 
have described patterns of adjustment made by farm families in the 
second generation as opportunities for owning land and supporting a 
family diminished. The alternatives included moving on, intensifying 
operations, or diversifying out of farming, sometimes into foundry 
operations. By extension these alternatives also characterized foundry 
"settlement" and development. See especially J.Lemon, 1972, The Best 
Poorman's Country, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, and 
P.Gagan, 1981, Hopeful Travellers: Families, Land and Social Change in 
Mid-Victorian Peel County, Canada West, Toronto, University of Toronto 
Press. 
11 The most well documented case is that of Dr. Calvin McQuesten, of 
Brockport, New York who set up a foundry, later the L.D.Sawyer works, 
in Hamilton, Ontario in 1835. McQuesten financed the foundry 
through his lending activities in New York state, and arranged for the 
transfer of foundrymen and other skilled workers from New York works, 
especially the Backus and Seymour foundry at Rochester in which he 
held an interest. This mother-daughter or spin-off relationship was 
then repeated throughout southern Ontario as apprentices or partners 
in the McQuesten works moved on to establish their own independent 
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Enterprises," op. cit. 
12 Several of the farm implement works were established in this way. For 
example John Watson established a foundry at Ayr in 1847 after serving 
. a moulding apprenticeship at Shotts Iron Works, Glasgow, Scotland, 
and then working in several New York shops and the McQuesten 
foundry from 1842-1845. The Haggert brothers trained in the Gurney 
stove works, Hamilton, before moving to St.Mary's and then Brampton. 
From there they established a branch at St.Thomas. The Hall works at 
Oshawa is better described as a daughter plant of a Rochester firm than 
its branch plant, because it was managed by Hall's son-in-law, and 
combined Montreal, New York and local capital. The John Watson and 
Company, Haggert Brothers and Joseph Hall files, Ontario Agricultural 
Museum. 
13 Both Hussey and McCormick made their machines available to other 
workshops in the 1840s, but it was after the 1847 McCormick patent 
extension case that licensing became common. L.Rogin, Introduction of 
Farm Machinery, op. cit., pp. 73-76. D.Hounshell, From the American 
System to Mass Production, op. cit., pp. 154-160. 
14 Obed Hussey obtained royalties from virtually every manufacturer of 
reapers and mowers for the life of his patents on the knife and finger-
guard. W.T.Hutchinson, 1935, Cyrus Hall McCormick, New York and 
London, Century Company, I, pp. 163-4, 449-542, II, p. 371. 
15 The idea of product systems is drawn from Ardrey's attempt to establish 
criteria for determining the significance of patents in the 1850s and 
1860s. He was faced with a growing number of patents which were "so 
complicated and so intermixed that it will be impossible to notice any 
more than such as seem to have been the beginning of certain systems 
or classes of reaping machines/' (R.L.Ardrey, American Agricultural Imple-
ments, op. cit., p. 48). Ardrey does not use the idea in any formal sense 
but it is possible to identify at least thirteen separate systems of reapers 
and mowers developed over the two decades to 1870 from his summary 
of product development. There were other separate systems. To my way 
of thinking they were systems in three senses: they were systems of 
(interchangeable) parts constituting a complex product; they were sys-
tems of patents protecting the product; and the patents were also 
associated with networks of licensed or otherwise related plants all 
producing a similar product under the same patent protection, or 
product system. 
16 R.L.Ardrey, American Agricultural Implements, op. cit., p. 52. 
17 The best example of this in the U.S. was the firm of William Anson 
Wood, brother of Walter A.Wood. At his Youngstown, Ohio plant, 
Wood made over 40,000 machines in the 1870s. William Deering in 
partnership with the Marsh brothers also performed well. W.T.Hutchin-
son, Cyrus Hall McCormick, op. cit., II, p. 571. 
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18 Although there were over 80 American patents for automatic binders 
before 1868, almost the entire industry based their wire binders on the 
Gordon designs and eighteen companies used the Appleby patents as 
the basis for their twine knotters so that five sixths of all binders were 
of the Appleby type. Almost all of the others were built by Walter 
A.Wood who made under the Holmes patent. McCormick organized a 
patent pool on binders based on the Gorham binder patents (which 
predated the Appleby rights) and forced other manufacturers to pay 
royalties in order to build any binder. Nevertheless the binder design 
was rapidly diffused through the industry. W.T.Hutchinson, Cyrus Hall 
McCormick, op. cit., Il, p. 540; L.Rogin, Introduction of Farm Machinery, 
op. cit., pp. 110-115. 
19 Even McCormick did not produce more than 20,000 machines in any 
one year before 1880. But the Chicago works was producing around 
50,000 machines by 1885 and nearer 100,000 in the early 1890s. These 
production increases were associated with the introduction of 
"American System of Production" techniques, the breaking of the Inter-
national Mulders' Union, the extension of moulders' hours and chan-
ges to the ratios of bucks, berkshires and moulders. D.Hounshell, From 
the American System to Mass Production, op. cit.; R.Ozanne, 1967, A 
Century of Labor-Management Relations at McCormick and International 
Harvester, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press. 
20 W.T.Hutchinson, Cyrus Hall McCormick, op. cit., Il, p. 571. 
21 The most celebrated Canadian case concerns the McCormick wire 
binder. McCormick licensed four Ontario companies to make his wire 
binders for the Ontario market while he sold in the Canadian west 
through Wesbrook and Fairchild, an agent based in Winnipeg. The four 
Ontario firms, J.Elliott and Son of London, D.Maxwell of Paris, Frost 
and Wood of Smiths Falls, and the Noxon brothers of Ingersoll, have 
been accused of copying the McCormick machines, but the truth of the 
matter is that McCormick failed to register his American patents on 
binders in Canada within a year of his U.S. patent registration. Thus, 
under Canadian law, he forfeited patent rights in Canada. There may 
have been an earlier case of copying: Helm and Son of Cobourg made 
McCormick reapers without a license in 1848. R.T.Naylor, History of 
Canadian Business, op. cit., I, p. 43; W.T.Hutchinson, Cyrus Hall Mc-
Cormick, op. cit., Il, p. 649; A.E.Skeoch, "Technology and Change/' 
unpublished PhD manuscript, Ontario Agricultural Museum, p. 145; 
S.Bennett, notes on Project Report, International Harvester Photographic 
Archives, Canadian Council of Archives, 1986/87, Ontario Agricultural 
Museum. 
22 W.T.Hutchinson, Cyrus Hall McCormick, op. cit., Il, pp. 411-440. 
23 For example, McCormick hunted down farmer inventions, bought part 
shares in the patent rights or developed alternate patent rights to cover 
the same development. Other companies followed the same practice. 
Walter A. Wood spent $100,000 between 1869 and 1874, mostly buying 
patents, in order to develop a self-binder. The most successful patent 
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pool was McCormick's binder ring. W.T.Hutchinson, Cyrus Hall Mc-
Cormick, op. cit., Il, pp. 530, 540-543, 555-558. 
24 D.Noble, 1977, America By Design, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 
85. 
25 W.T.Hutchinson, Cyrus Hall McCormick, op. cit., Il, p. 569. 
26 Cf. wood turning lathes, where a monopoly was secured by protracted 
court action. See C.Cooper, 1991, Shaping Invention: Thomas Blanchard's 
Machinery and Patent Management in Nineteenth Century America, New 
York, Columbia University Press. 
27 The classic example is the consolidation of the Cayuga Chief, Buckeye 
and Ball two-wheel, hinged-bar mower patent systems. R.L.Ardrey, 
American Agricultural Implements, op. cit., p. 94. 
28 For example the Champion system in the U.S. consisted of three 
separate factories which in 1875 made a total of 30,000 machines on 
the basis of related Warder, Bushnell and Whiteley patents and with a 
central engineering department headed by William Whiteley. The 
Canada Farmer, 15 July 1875, p. 5. 
29 Cf. L.R.Rogin, Introduction of Farm Machinery, op. cit., pp. 73-76. While 
early forms of harvester like the Hussey were made in blacksmith shops 
the products quickly became too complex for this. See D.Hounshell, 
From the American System to Mass Production, op. cit., pp. 154-160, and 
Rogin, for a discussion of the problems McCormick had in obtaining 
product quality and standardization. 
30 McCormick continued to buy sickles and malleable iron finger bars 
from outside contractors for most of the period to 1890. He did erect his 
own cutter bars and knives from these parts. Ontario manufacturers 
bought their cutter bars ready made from Whitman and Barnes of 
St.Catharines after 1872. D.Hounshell, From the American System to Mass 
Production, op. cit., p. 157. 
31 R.T.Naylor, History of Canadian Business, op. cit., Il, p. 41. Of course this 
was not the first case of obtaining American implement designs. Massey 
had copied a thresher in 1847, and other founders, like McQuesten and 
Company of Hamilton, had also copied or been licensed to produce 
other commodities. 
32 For example J.Forsyth's repair lists for machines made in 1871-1874 
differentiated parts developed by Forsyth from those of the original 
"Ohio" machines. Forsyth recommended that parts from other Ohio 
machines and other manufacturers of the "Ohio" system could be 
substituted where appropriate. Forsyth and Company, Manufacturers of 
Dominion Harvesters, Dundas, Ontario, True Banner Press, 1874, Provin-
cial Archives of Ontario, Pamphlet No. 15. 
33 R.T.Naylor, History of Canadian Business, op. cit., Il, p. 43. 
34 The three were J.Dick of Oshawa's improved self-rake reaper known as 
"Dick's Harvester", the combined reaper and mower developed by 
E.Shupe of St.George, and the "Excelsior" combined reaper and mower. 
J.Dick is known to have been associated with the Hall works in Oshawa, 
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and E.Shupe with the Haggert brothers, both of which produced 
American machines. 
35 L.D.Sawyer and Company, 1869, Illustrated Catalogue, Ontario Agricul-
tural Museum, p. 9. 
36 For example McCormick licensed Burgess and Key of Brentwood, Essex 
who subcontracted to European manufacturers. As in his early U.S. 
licensing agreements, McCormick encountered difficulties as the British 
firm developed its own improvements and became less interested in 
marketing or producing his machines. The Forbush patents were manufac-
tured by John Palmer of Stockton-on-Tees. Hussey machines were made by 
at least four British manufacturers in the 1850s. W.A.Wood licensed 
W.H.Cranston of London who sold over 2,000 reapers between 1858 and 
1862. W.T.Hutchinson, Cyrus Hall McCormick, op. cit., Il, pp. 411-414 and 
440. See I, pp. 377-408 and II, pp. 405-447 for a detailed history of the 
American invasion of Britain and Europe in the 1850s and 1860s. 
37 In 1853 William McDougall was sent to the U.S. to investigate 
American farm machinery and the possibilities of obtaining it for 
Canadian farmers. He advocated the extension of patent rights to 
Americans in order to encourage the licensing of Canadian manufac-
turers. In 1869 Professor Buckland was sent to England to secure farm 
implements for the new museum planned by the Ontario government. 
Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture and Arts, Toronto, 1853 and 
1869. 
38 Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture and Arts of the Province of Ontario 
for the Year 1869, Toronto, 1870, p. 216. 
39 Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture and Arts, 1869, Appendix B, 
Mechanics' Institutes, pp. 215-231. 
40 C.R.Young, Early Engineering Education at Toronto, 1851-1919, Toronto, 
pp. 72-73. 
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North American Patterns?" in R.Hall, W.Westfall and L.Sefton Mac-
Dowell (eds.), 1988, Patterns of the Past, Toronto, Dundurn Press, pp. 
238-254. 
42 Extensions became standard practice. Thus in 1887 the Canadian 
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of voiding the grant, but it empowers the Commissioner of Patents to 
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upon one petition.", Canadian Manufacturer, 7 October 1887, p. 228. 
43 R.T.Naylor, History of Canadian Business, op. cit., Il, pp. 42-43. 
44 R.T.Naylor, History of Canadian Business, op. cit., Il, pp. 38-64. 
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rights). Since Deering, McCormick and WAWood and other U.S. com-
panies took out patent rights in Canada their licensees, like Frost and 
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48 R.T.Naylor, History of Canadian Business, op. cit., II, p. 46, Table X(l). 
49 This and other information on the Osborne company's product 
development used here are from R.L.Ardrey, American Agricultural Imple-
ments, op. cit., pp. 224-228. 
50 M.Denison, 1949, Harvest Triumphant, Toronto, Collins, p. 86. 
51 W.T.Hutchinson, Cyrus Hall McCormick, op. cit., Il, pp. 475, 607, 618 
and 699. 
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cit., Il, pp. 475, 607, 618 and 699. 
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son, Cyrus Hall McCormick, op. cit., Il, pp. 607 and 699. 
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